[52] Réformer l'UEM: le paquet de la "Saint-Nicolas"
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Editorial. Le partage du risque dans l'UEM: l'enjeu central des propositions de réformes
Dans ses remarques présentées le 17 mai 2018 à l'occasion du colloque organisé en son honneur, Vitor Constâncio, membre du directoire de la BCE, a visé juste, lorsqu'il a placé la question du partage du risque au coeur de ses réflexions et des débats sur les réformes de l'Union économique et monétaire [...]
Les défis des réformes futures de la gouvernance économique européenne
À la suite de la crise économique et financière, la gouvernance économique européenne s’est enrichie d’un semestre européen et d’un mécanisme d’assistance financière. Ces deux instruments ont engendré une évolution institutionnelle et normative de la gouvernance économique. Ils confèrent, en particulier, un rôle plus important à l’Eurogroupe et à la Banque centrale européenne. Cependant, les mécanismes de contrôle existants en droit de l’Union n’ont pas été adaptés, créant des failles dans les garanties démocratiques et juridictionnelles offertes par le droit de l’Union. Rétablir ces mécanismes de contrôle et les renforcer constituent les principaux défis des réformes futures de l’Union économique et monétaire.
Le Fonds monétaire européen: nouvel instrument politique plutôt qu’économique
En décembre 2017, la Commission européenne a proposé de transformer le Mécanisme européen de stabilité (MES) en Fonds monétaire européen (FME). Cet article revient brièvement sur la genèse du MES et sur ses limites, avant d’aborder les avantages et les inconvénients principaux du projet de FME
Un mécanisme de stabilisation pour la zone euro
Différentes solutions existent pour renforcer la résistance de la zone euro aux chocs économiques. Elles consistent à doter la zone euro d’une capacité budgétaire centralisée qui puisse jouer une fonction de stabilisation macroéconomique. À cet effet, la Commission européenne propose d’ajouter une ligne au budget de l’Union européenne (UE). Le Fonds monétaire international suggère un "fonds pour les mauvais jours". Des économistes se sont intéressés à d’autres solutions telles qu’un système commun d’assurance chômage ou un budget propre de la zone euro. Cet article discute l’utilité et le réalisme de ces solutions.
A European Finance Minister - Symbolism Over Substance?
This contribution begins with a summary of the current state of euro area governance in the context of crisis management, the European semester, and banking union in order to appreciate the ramification of consolidating some of these roles into a single post. It continues with an overview of how thinking about a European Finance Minister has changed over the last few years, followed by the current Commission proposal. The final section analyses the potential impact of a European Finance Minister on euro area governance. The post would primarily have a coordinating role unless additional budgetary resources are allotted to the accompanying European Finance Ministry and/or the policy instruments themselves are reformed. Pursuing the creation of this post should be postponed until the larger issues related to the budget (both its size and how it would be used) are settled.
The evolving role of the ECB during the euro-crisis
After a first decade of – more or less – business as usual - during the Euro-crisis, the European Central Bank started to play an additional role: supporting states and banks facing the crisis. As a consequence, it has been accused to exceed its own powers as codified in the EU foundational treaties. The allegations were related to the scarce respect of its own legal framework (competences and limits established by the EU treaties); secondly, they regarded her invasion of the field of economic policy while it had to limit its intervention to monetary policy; finally, it was pointed out how it played a too “political” role. The ECB’s intervention - even if unconventional – was required by the critical moment and felt within the scope and the borders of monetary policy. Being the ECB a technocratic institution, it plays a peculiar “political” activity when it is called to exercise a discretion within the range of multiple policy options. Its freedom of judgment has to be grounded and duly motivated on economic reasoning, relating it to price stability.
Reform of the statute of the ESCB: in search of the right institutional balance
On 22 June 2017, the European Central Bank issued a recommendation to the co-legislators for an amendment to article 22 of his Statute, ensuring that the regulatory power conferred by this article extend to central clearing counterparties (CCPs).This was a legally necessary change since a Commission proposal amending the European Market Infrastructures Regulation (so-called "EMIR 2.2") issued the same month would strengthen the role of central banks in the supervision of CCPs. According to the interpretation of article 22 of the statute of the ESCB and the ECB given by the ECJ in its 2015 ruling on Case T-496/11, the ECB would be unable to take up its new tasks under the amended regulation without amending its Statute.
Examining this recommendation, key issues for the co-legislators will now relate to the avoidance of conflicts of rules between other EU institutions and the ECB in the exercise of its new powers, the consistency between the amendment to the ECB statute and the future European Market Infrastructures Regulation, and the degree of prescriptiveness that the future statute should have.